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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
JAYE SMITH CONSTRUCTION CO., 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
BOARD OF EDUCATION, GRANITE 
SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 14497 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This action was brought by plaintiff to recover the actual 
costs of Weyerhaeuser Blue Star and Red Star decking used by 
plaintiff in the construction of the Kearns athletic addition 
and on the gymnasium floor at the Kearns Junior High physical 
education addition. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Judgment was granted by Stewart M. Hanson after trial for 
the full amount prayed for by plaintiff in his Complaint, plus 
the additional $150.00 for the striping which had been performed 
by plaintiff. Total amount of the judgment was $5,591.30. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Granite School District, defendant, seeks to have the 
judgment of the lower court reversed and judgment entered in 
favor of itself and against the plaintiff no cause of action. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff will restate the facts that it considers 
supported by a fair, full and careful examination of the whole 
record. 
Plaintiff's claim arises out of a construction project 
which he completed for the defendant at the Kearns Junior High 
School physical education addition. He claims the actual cost of 
Weyerhaeuser Blue Star and Red Star decking installed which was 
unavailable at the time of the bid opening, but was required by 
the plans and specifications. 
The following facts are undisputed: 
(a) The proposal form, plaintiff's bid, Exhibit 10-P, 
dated March 6, 19 73 had enclosed with it the letter of March 6, 
1973, Exhibit 11-P, which advised the School Board of the problem 
relating to the Weyerhaeuser decking; 
(b) The facts stated in the letter of March 6, 1973 
relating to the decking were true. The material was not: available, 
was not being manufactured, and no accurate determination of price 
could be made for the material at the time of the bid opening; 
(c) The plans, specifications, all documents and addenda 
entitled "Physical Education Addition, Kearns Junior High School", 
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were made a part of the proposal form by reference and were the 
basis of the proposal form and the ultimate agreement, Exhibit 12-P; 
(d) The plans and specifications required the use of 
Weyerhaeuser Blue Star and Weyerhaeuser Red Star heavy decking 
and that material was actually installed by plaintiff; 
(e) Plaintiff advised the School District, by and through 
its designated agent Arthur K. Olsen, the architect, on May 23, 1973, 
that the decking had been obtained and that the price was higher 
than quoted and restated the original term of the letter of March 6, 
1973, Exhibit 11-P (See Exhibit 15-P). 
(f) Defendant permitted plaintiff to proceed with the 
installation of the Weyerhaeuser Blue Star and Weyerhaeuser Red 
Star heavy decking without objection, knowing of the increased 
expense, and accepted plaintiff's work; 
(g) Plaintiff made its claim promptly for the additional 
cost (Exhibit 15-P). It became a matter of discussion between 
the architect and the School District officials during the 
construction period (See Inter-School District correspondence, 
Exhibits 16-P and 7-D); 
(h) The material specified actually cost what plaintiff 
paid and his charges were reasonable; 
(i) Change order No. 3, Exhibit 20-P, was actually approved 
by the architect Arthur K. Olsen, who is designated in * the agreement 
as the agent for the defendant with whom the contractor must 
resolve his differences; 
(j) The painting addition for basketball lines on the 
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gymnasium floor, amounting to $150.00, was also the subject of 
a change order approved by the architect and submitted to the 
defendant. A copy of said claim was a part of the plaintiff's 
Answers to Interrogatories filed with the court and mailed to 
defendant's attorney on the 18th of November, 1974; 
(k) Defendant has refused to pay either of the items that 
the plaintiff claims are due. 
There is a dispute in the testimony and a direct: contradiction 
as to whether or not the inability of the contractors to obtain a 
supply or a quote as to price for the Weyerhaeuser decking at the 
time of the bid opening was called to the School Board's attention. 
Plaintiff's testimony is clear to the effect that such problem 
was called to the Board's attention. Board witnesses do not 
recall such an event and the minutes of meeting at which the bids 
were opened do not reflect a reference to the letter, Exhibit P-11, 
which was with plaintiff's bid proposal. 
The amount of the proposal form was placed in defendant's 
form contract which became Exhibit 12-P. The agreement provides 
that Arthur K. Olsen, the architect, is the person authorized by 
defendant to supervise the construction. The contract provides 
that if the architect provides additional drawings and specifications 
the contractor shall perform, execute and complete the work in 
accordance with such additional drawings (Pg A-2, Exhibit 12-P). 
Paragraph 2 of 12-P provides that the contractor will 
follow generally the directions of the architect and that the 
architect's interpretation of the drawings and specifications 
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shall be conclusive on the parties to the agreement. The third 
paragraph provides again that the architect's direction shall 
govern the contractor's decisions in choosing material. The 
fourth paragraph provides that the contractor shall not deviate 
from the drawings or specifications or execute any extra work of 
any kind unless authorized in writing by the architect. The amount 
to be paid, allowed or deducted on account of any such alterations 
or extra work, if any, shall be stated in writing or provisions 
made for the determination thereof in said written authorization. 
The eleventh paragraph of the agreement provides that there will 
be paid the basic sum of $164,022.00 subject to additions and 
deductions as herein provided and subject to the provisions of the 
agreement. The fifteenth paragraph of the agreement provides that 
the architect's decision as to the true meaning of the plans and 
specifications, performance of work or completion of jobs, shall 
be final and conclusive upon the parties. 
The obtaining of prior written approval was a procedure 
the evidence shows was not followed. (See correspondence, Exhibits 
15-P, 7-D, 16-P). It is a common practice in the construction 
business to do the work and then do the documentation (Pg 46 of Tr.). 
Plaintiff obtained change orders approved by the architect 
on both of the extras for which he seeks payment. 
When plaintiff requested a change order approval, he then 
ran into the difficulty which gives rise to the present action. 
Apparently the matter came somewhat to a head immediately in a 
letter dated June 26, 1973 from the architect to the District 
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Supervisor. In the letter the architect states.-
"It appears that he needs to have his contract increased 
due to the bid price he used and the price he ultimately 
had to pay after he finally obtained the decking.11 
(Exhibit 16-P) 
Defendant still refused to pay for the decking. An 
additional letter was written by the architect to the Supervisor 
relating to Mr. Smith's requested changes. It is Exhibit 8-D 
dated January 8, 1974 and refers to change order No. 2 and approves 
the painting of the additional lines on the floor which Mr. Smith 
sought payment for in the amount of $150.00, advises that the 
wood decking was still not resolved and that a meeting would have 
to be held to discuss it (Exhibit 8-D). 
The discussions occurred but nothing was resolved, and it 
became necessary for the plaintiff to bring the action from which 
this appeal arises. 
After trial the court made Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law and a Judgment which was subsequently amended and became 
the final judgment of the court. The court found the disputed 
question of fact in plaintiff's favor and in Finding No. 4 found 
that the letter written by plaintiff was noticed by agents of the 
defendant or should have been, in the exercise of reasonable care, 
noticed in the examination of the bids. Court further found that 
the qualification letter was a part of the plaintiff's bid and 
became a part of the contract executed by the parties on the 12th 
of March, 1973, Court found that the defendant had received the 
benefit of the decking and that equity required it to pay the 
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reasonable cost and value of the materials. In paragraph 6 of 
the Findings, he further found that it would be inequitable and 
constitute unjust enrichment for the defendant to require plaintiff 
to furnish and bear the cost of the redwood decking without 
compensation. Court also found that the $150.00 for painting the 
basketball floor was due. The Amended Judgment granting plaintiff 
judgment for the sum of $5,591.30 adjusted the period for which 
interest was allowed plaintiff on the balance owing as found by 
the court. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
ALL DOCUMENTS WHICH SHED LIGHT ON MEANING OF A 
CONTRACT MAY BE CONSIDERED IN INTERPRETATION. 
The thrust of defendant's argument under Point I of its 
brief is that the trial court could not receive in evidence and 
consider Exhibit 11-P, plaintiff's note attached to the proposal 
form. The note accurately set forth a state of facts that related 
to one of the items included in the proposal. It is undisputed 
that the statements in the exhibit were true. At the time of the 
bid opening, prices on this particular item could not be obtained 
and a base price was included for the purpose of calculating the 
bid. 
Based on the proposal form, a contract was prepared 
(Exhibit 12-P). It refers to the plans and specifications for the 
building, a document completely outside of the contract. 
Fortunately, there is no argument about the plans and specifications. 
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They include the requirement that the Red Star decking and the 
Blue Star decking manufactured by Weyerhaeuser be used, and this 
is the item referred to in Exhibit 11-P. 
Williston on Contracts, Third Edition, §628, Pg. 904, Vol. 4, 
recites the general rule that documents referred to in an integrated 
agreement become a part of the agreement as far as they are 
incorporated by reference. This is true even when the items such 
as specifications and plans for construction are not attached to 
the written agreement. Then the Section recites as the law the 
following: 
"Even where a writing does not refer to another writing, 
if such other writing was made as part of the same 
transaction, the two should be interpreted together.Tf 
Pg. 904. 
Plaintiff submits that it is obvious that the proposal form, 
the letter attached, the contract, the plans and specifications, 
are all documents that should be referred to by the court and 
interpreted together in arriving at the state of the facts on 
which the parties contracted at the time of the contract. 
Defendant cites for the court's consideration Bullfrog 
Marina, Inc. v. Lentz, 501 P.2d 266, 28 Utah 2d 261. Plaintiff 
submits that this decision supports the basic principles that 
uphold the trial court's decision. In Bullfrog Marina, Inc., the 
trial court had held that an employment agreement and a lease that 
had been executed by the parties were related and that both of the 
documents had to be interpreted together, even though neither 
referred to the other, and set down the principle of law that 
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plaintiff believes is applicable, Utah 267: 
"The trial court did not err in following the rule of 
law that where two or more instruments are executed by 
the same parties contemporaneously, or at different 
times in the course of the same transaction, and concern 
the same subject matter, they will be read and construed 
together so far as determining the respective rights and 
interests of the parties, although they do not in terms 
refer to each other." 
An additional important decision that recites correctly the 
law where there are more than one writing executed contemporaneously 
with the contract or relating to the execution of the contract is 
Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Bybee, 306 P.2d 773, 6 Utah 2d 98. 
The court there held that where the intentions of the parties are 
to be ascertained, the document itself is first considered, then 
contemporaneous writings concerning the same subject matter are 
considered, and third, extrinsic parol evidence of intentions may 
be considered. 
Plaintiff's position is that the exhibit relating to the 
Weyerhaeuser decking is not an attempt to vary the terms of a 
written instrument, but simply shows the state of facts at the 
time the proposal form was executed. Defendant prepared the plans 
and specifications requiring Weyerhaeuser decking and should be 
charged with knowledge of its unavailability and price uncertainty. 
Certainly if plaintiff, after commencing the construction, had 
been unable to obtain Weyerhaeuser decking and requested a right 
to substitute, Exhibit 11-P would have been something the parties 
would consider. If substitution had been permitted and a higher 
price material than those estimated in the bid were required, no 
one would argue, it is submitted, that plaintiff would not be 
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entitled to the additional allowance. Or, by the same token, if 
substitution were permitted and cheaper materials than the amount 
set forth in the bid were obtained, it is obvious that a reduction 
in the contract payment would be made. „,>•.'•• 
An even more recent case decided by the court indicating 
the application of basic rules for the interpretation of contracts 
to municipal corporations and other public organizations is Midwest 
Realty v. City of West Jordan, Case No. 13874, decided on October 29, 
1975. There bid forms were used and minutes of council meetings 
examined to determine the agreement between the parties and the 
City was required to pay for the reasonable value of the advantages 
and improvements it received. 
When all of the documents are examined under which plaintiff 
constructed the Kearns Junior High facility, plaintiff submits that 
there is adequate provision for the interpretation placed on the 
agreement by the trial court. 
The agreement provides for adjustments as the construction 
project proceeds. The adjustments to be made by consultation and 
through the architect who is designated as the defendant's 
representative. The modifications may increase or decrease the 
contract price. If work is deleted, costs are decreased. If 
added, increased. 
The Weyerhaeuser Blue Star and Red Star decking were items 
which the contractor foresaw would become problems in the 
construction. The material was not being manufactured and a 
supply was not available, so price would be uncertain. Should 
plaintiff now be penalized for its efforts to be fair and equitable 
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in performing the contract undertaken for the School Board. 
The architect, the designated agent of the Board, agreed 
that the contractor is entitled to an increase in the price, and 
under the facts presented the court agreed. 
It is submitted the results reached are well within the 
terms of the written instruments which the court considered properly. 
POINT II 
CHANGE ORDERS APPROVED BY ARCHITECT MAY BE BASIS 
FOR COURT'S DETERMINATION OF EQUITABLE SETTLEMENT. 
Defendant, in its second point, argues that the change 
orders that were executed by architect Olsen, acting as agent for 
the Board, are not binding upon the Board. It is true that no final 
approval of said change orders was ever obtained by plaintiff. Had 
he been able to obtain the approval and get paid, then this matter 
would not be here for the court's consideration. The refusal to 
approve was arbitrary, unreasonable, and a violation of the 
agreement. 
Consider first change order No. 2 for the striping of the 
basketball courts. There is no dispute about this being an extra 
activity required by the contractor. There is no dispute about 
the reasonableness of the charge of $150.00. There is no dispute 
about the fact that it was done at the request of the District and 
was not included in plaintiff's contract. Yet the change order 
was not approved after it had been submitted by the architect and 
by plaintiff. No objection was made by the District as the 
agreement required. At the time of the trial, witness Davidson, 
who was the representative of the District during the construction 
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period, testified concerning the $150.00 item: 
"As an extra expense, I feel that the contractor be 
v paid for it, should at this time.M (Pg. 68, Tr. of T.) 
Plaintiff might be willing to concede that the executed 
change orders requested by him were not binding upon the District 
until approved by someone above the level of the architect. But 
certainly approval could not be withheld arbitrarily. In the light 
of all the evidence, the payments are in fairness and equity due 
to the contractor. 
In a very recent decision, this court, in considering 
construction contracts and their interpretation, set forth the 
rule which, plaintiff submits, is applicable here. In ZionVs Property, 
Inc. v. Holt, 538 P.2d 1319, Pg. 1321, the court stated: 
f!We accept the correctness of plaintiff's argument 
that there is implied in any contract a covenant of 
good faith and cooperation, which should prevent 
either party from impeding the other's performance 
of his obligations thereunder;" 
The court's findings do not require a finding that the 
District was bound by the architect's approval of the change orders. 
On the basis of the equitable principles cited, the District should 
pay the charge for decking specified. Unjust enrichment would 
occur if it were not required to pay. 
Both of the witnesses for defendant, that is Davidson and 
Hilton, testified that many adjustments are necessary in the 
construction of large projects, and the adjustments that are made 
are those which the District and the contractor, in negotiation, 
i 
consider to be fair under all the circumstances. Their testimony 
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establishes the principle requiring fair play and good faith in 
the adjusting claims. (See Davidson, Pg. 64 of Tr. of T.; Hilton, 
Pg. 80 of Tr. of T.) 
The law recognizes that in every contract there is an 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. (17 C.J.S., 
§328, Pg. 285-86) 
A contract conferring on one party discretionary power 
which affects the other party's rights imposes a duty to exercise 
such discretion in good faith and in accordance with fair dealing. 
California Lettuce Growers v. Union Sugar Co., 45 C.2d 474, 289 P.2d 
785. 
This court in State Automobile & Casualty Underwriters v. 
Salisbury, 27 Utah 2d 229, 494 P.2d 529, set forth the contractual 
obligation to be implied in the following language: 
flBut also to be considered in connection therewith 
are the mutual responsibilities the parties have to 
each other which are implied from the operation of 
law applicable to such relationship. Arising from 
what is commonly known and accepted as to the customs 
and experience in the everyday affairs of life, the 
parties each has the right to assume that the other 
will perform the duties he agrees to with reasonable 
care, competence, diligence and good faith, even though 
such terms are not expressly spelled out in the 
contract; and if failure to so perform those duties 
results in damage to the other party he is entitled 
to recover for breach of the contractual duties." 
No evidence was presented which indicated that the adjustments 
requested by plaintiff were not fair, equitable and reasonable. 
The court found in accordance with the claim of plaintiff that the 
items should be paid him in settlement of his contract with the 
District, and that to refuse payment would be an unjust enrichment 
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to the District, permitting it to take his materials without just 
compensation. 
POINT III
 ; 
AMENDMENT TO INCLUDE STRIPING CHANGE WAS PROPERLY 
GRANTED. 
Defendant claims unfair surprise in the court's permitting 
the amendment to be made to the Complaint. It related to the 
$150.00 item for striping of the basketball floor. It was not 
included in the original Complaint because plaintiff believed it 
to be an item that the District never intended to dispute. An 
item which it thought the District would pay without being a part 
of the litigation. 
As early as January 8, 1974, the painting of additional 
lines on the wood floor was approved by the architect when the 
matter was discussed in April, 1974, and change orders were 
prepared and submitted. Change order No. 2 covering the striping 
was not a matter to be contested. (See Exhibit 22-P for the 
reference to this item). 
In addition to the references made in the exhibits referred 
to, in Answers to Interrogatories during the discovery period, 
Answer No. 4 on Pg. 12 of the Record on Appeal states the following 
"Attached to these Answers and by this reference made 
a part hereof, are the two change orders which have 
been approved by the architect and forwarded to the 
School Board. Neither of the change orders has been 
paid. It is plaintiff's position that the modification 
on contract price is provided for in the contract and 
the change orders, once approved by the agent for the 
School Board, namely the architect, the School Board 
is then bound by said approved change and must pay the 
additional price as part of the contract." 
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The exhibits were the change orders now in this litigation. 
Rule 15 of the U.R.C.P. provides that where issues are not 
raised by the pleadings, amendments may be made as may be necessary 
to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise the issues 
upon motion of any party at any time, even after judgment, and 
provides that the court may allow the pleadings to be amended 
when the presentation of the merits of the action xvill be served 
thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the court that 
the admission of such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining 
his action or defense upon the merits. 
This court, in a carefully stated interpretation of Rule 
15(b) , U.R.C.P., set down the principles, plaintiff believes, 
which require approval of the trial court's order permitting 
amendment. See Cheney v. Rucker, 14 Utah 2d 205, 381 P.2d 86, at 
pg. 211: 
MThey must all be looked to in the light of their even 
more fundamental purpose of liberalizing both pleading 
and procedure to the end that the parties are afforded 
the privilege of presenting whatever legitimate 
contentions they have pertaining to their dispute. 
What they are entitled to is notice of the issues 
raised and an opportunity to meet them. When this 
? is accomplished, that is all that is required. Our 
rules provide for liberality to allow examination 
into and settlement of all issues bearing upon the 
controversy, but safeguard the rights of the other 
party to have a reasonable time to meet a new issue 
if he so requests. Rule 15(b), U.R.C.P., so states. 
It further allows for an amendment to conform to the 
proof after trial or even after judgment, and indicates 
that if the ends of justice so require, 'failure so to 
amend does not affect the result of the trial of these 
issues.1 This idea is confirmed by Rule 54(c) (1), 
U.R.C.P: !(E)very final judgment shall grant the 
relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered 
is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such 
relief in his pleadings . ! ,f 
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See also Seamons v. Andersen, 122 Utah 497, 252 P.2d 209; Morris 
v. Russell, 120 Utah 545, 236 P.2d 451. 
In the light of the fact that the $150.00 item had been a 
matter repeatedly discussed during the time that this case was 
being brought to issue and to trial and was an item that the 
plaintiff had been assured there was no serious controversy about, 
plaintiff submits that the claim that defendant was surprised or 
prejudiced in any way by having this matter determined and 
submitted to the trial court and included in the ultimate judgment 
against the District seems to be without merit. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff respectfully submits that the judgment of the 
trial court should be affirmed, that costs be allowed to the 
plaintiff. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DWIGHT L. KING 
2121 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Attorney for Respondent 
( 
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